Coevolutionary Genetic Algorithms for Establishing Nash Equilibrium in
  Symmetric Cournot Games by Protopapas, Mattheos K. et al.
Coevolutionary Genetic Algorithms for
Establishing Nash Equilibrium in Symmetric
Cournot Games
Mattheos Protopapas∗ Francesco Battaglia†
Elias Kosmatopoulos‡
October 23, 2018
Abstract. We use co-evolutionary genetic algorithms to model the play-
ers’ learning process in several Cournot models, and evaluate them in terms of
their convergence to the Nash Equilibrium. The “social-learning” versions of
the two co-evolutionary algorithms we introduce, establish Nash Equilibrium
in those models, in contrast to the “individual learning” versions which, as we
see here, do not imply the convergence of the players’ strategies to the Nash
outcome. When players use “canonical co-evolutionary genetic algorithms” as
learning algorithms, the process of the game is an ergodic Markov Chain, and
therefore we analyze simulation results using both the relevant methodology and
more general statistical tests, to find that in the “social” case, states leading
to NE play are highly frequent at the stationary distribution of the chain, in
contrast to the “individual learning” case, when NE is not reached at all in our
simulations; to find that the expected Hamming distance of the states at the
limiting distribution from the “NE state” is significantly smaller in the “social”
than in the “individual learning case”; to estimate the expected time that the
“social” algorithms need to get to the “NE state” and verify their robustness
and finally to show that a large fraction of the games played are indeed at the
Nash Equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The “Cournot Game” models an oligopoly of two or more firms that simultane-
ously define the quantities they supply to the market, which in turn define both
the market price and the equilibrium quantity in the market. Co-evolutionary
Genetic Algorithms have been used for studying Cournot games, since Arifovic
[3] studied the cobweb model. In contrast to the classical genetic algorithms
used for optimization, the co-evolutionary versions are distinct at the issue of
the objective function. In a classical genetic algorithm the objective function
for optimization is given before hand, while in the co-evolutionary case, the ob-
jective function changes during the course of play as it is based on the choices
of the players. So the players’ strategies and, consequently, the genetic algo-
rithms that are used to determine the players’ choices, co-evolve with the goals
of these algorithms, within the dynamic process of the system under consider-
ation. Arifovic (1994) used four different co-evolutionary genetic algorithms to
model players’ learning and decision making: two single-population algorithms,
where each player’s choice is represented by a single chromosome in the pop-
ulation of the single genetic algorithm that is used to determine the evolution
of the system, and two multi-population algorithms, where each player has its
own population of chromosomes and its own Genetic Algorithm to determine
his strategy. Arifovic links the chromosomes’ fitness to the profit established
after a round of play, during which the algorithms define the active quantities
that players choose to produce and sell at the market. The quantities chosen
define, in turn, the total quantity and the price at the market, leading to a
specific profit for each player. Thus, the fitness function is dependent on the
actions of the players on the previous round, and the co-evolutionary ”nature”
of the algorithms is established.
In Arifovic’s algorithms [3], as well as any other algorithms we use here, each
chromosome’s fitness is proportional to its profit, as given by
pi(qi) = Pqi − ci(qi) (1)
where ci(qi) is the player’s cost for producing qi items of product and P is the
market price, as determined by all players’ quantity choices, from the inverse
demand function
P = a− b
n∑
i=1
qi (2)
In Arifovic’s algorithms, populations are updated after every single Cournot
game is played, and converge to the Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium and
not the Nash equilibrium [2],[14]. Convergence to the competitive equilibrium
means that agents’ actions -as determined by the algorithm- tend to maximize
(1), with price regarded as given, instead of
max
qi
pi(qi) = P (qi)qi − ci(qi) (3)
that gives the Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies [2]. Later variants of Ari-
fovic’s model [5],[7] share the same properties.
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Vriend was the first to present a co-evolutionary genetic algorithm in which
the equilibrium price and quantity on the market -but not the strategies of the
individual players as we will see later- converge to the respective values of the
Nash Equilibrium [15]. In his individual learning, multi-population algorithm,
which is one of the two algorithms that we study -and transform- in this article,
chromosomes’ fitness is calculated only after the chromosomes are used in a
game, and the population is updated after a given number of games are played
with the chromosomes of the current populations. Each player has its own pop-
ulation of chromosomes, from which he picks at random one chromosome to
determine its quantity choice at the current round. The fitness of the chromo-
some, based on the profit acquired from the current game is then calculated,
and after a given number of rounds, the population is updated by the usual
genetic algorithm operators (crossover and mutation). Since the populations
are updated separately, the algorithm is regarded as individual learning. These
settings yield Nash Equilibrium values for the total quantity on the market and,
consequently, for the price as well, as proven by Vallee and Yildizoglou [14].
Finally Alkemade et al. [1] present the first (single population) social learn-
ing algorithm that yields Nash Equilibrium values for the total quantity and the
price. The four players pick at random one chromosome from a single popula-
tion, in order to define their quantity for the current round. Then profits are
calculated and the fitness value of the active chromosomes is updated, based on
the profit of the player who has chosen them. The population is updated by
crossover and mutation, after all chromosomes have been used. As Alkemade et
al. [1] point out, the algorithm leads the total quantities and the market price
to the values corresponding to the NE for these measures.
2 The Models
In all the above models, researchers assume symmetric cost functions (all players
have identical cost functions), which implies that the Cournot games studied are
symmetric. Additionally, Vriend [15], Alkemade et al. [1] and Arifovic [3] -in
one of the models she investigates- use linear (and decreasing) cost functions. If
a symmetric Cournot Game, has in addition, indivisibilities (discrete, but closed
strategy sets), it is a pseudo-potential game [6] and the following theorem holds:
Theorem 1. “Consider a n-player Cournot Game. We assume that the
inverse demand function P is strictly decreasing and log-concave; the cost func-
tion ci of each firm is strictly increasing and left-continuous; and each firm’s
monopoly profit becomes negative for large enough q. The strategy sets Si, con-
sisting of all possible levels of output producible by firm i, are not required to be
convex, but just closed. Under the above assumptions, the Cournot Game has a
Nash Equilibrium [in pure strategies]” [6].
This theorem is relevant when one investigates Cournot Game equilibrium
using Genetic Algorithms, because a chromosome can have only a finite number
of values and, therefore, it is the discrete version of the Cournot Game that is
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investigated, in principle. Of course, if one can have a dense enough discretiza-
tion of the strategy space, so that the NE value of the continuous version of
the Cournot Game is included in the chromosomes’ accepted values, it is the
case for the NE of the continuous and the discrete version under investigation
to coincide.
In all three models we investigate in this paper, the assumptions of the
above theorem hold, and hence there is a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.
We investigate those models for the cases of n = 4 and n = 20 players.
The first model we use is the linear model used in [1]: The inverse demand
is given by
P = 256−Q (4)
with Q =
∑n
i=1 qi, and the common cost function of the n players is
c(qi) = 56qi (5)
The Nash Equilibrium quantity choice of each of the 4 players is qˆ = 40 [1]. In
the case of 20 players we have, by solving (3), qˆ = 9.5238. The second model
has a polynomial inverse demand function.
P = aQ3 − b (6)
and linear symmetric cost function
c = xqi + y (7)
If we assume a < 0 and x > 0 the demand and cost functions will be decreasing
and increasing, respectively, and the assumptions of theorem (1) hold. We set
a = −1, b = 7.36× 107 + 10, x = y = 10, so qˆ = 20 for n = 20 and qˆ = 86.9401
for n = 4.
Finally, in the third model, we use a radical inverse demand function
P = aQ
3
2 + b (8)
and the linear cost function (7). For a = −1, b = 8300, x = 100 and y = 10
theorem (1) holds and qˆ = 19.3749 for n = 20, while qˆ = 82.2143 for n = 4.
3 The Algorithms
We use two multi-population (each player has its own population of chromo-
somes representing its alternative choices at any round) co-evolutionary genetic
algorithms, Vriend’s individual learning algorithm [15] and co-evolutionary pro-
gramming, a similar algorithm that has been used for the game of prisoner’s
dilemma [10] and, unsuccessfully, for Cournot Duopoly [13]. Since those two
algorithms don’t, as it will be seen, lead to convergence to the NE in the models
under consideration, we introduce two different versions of the algorithms, as
well, which are characterized by the use of opponent choices, when the new gen-
eration of each player’s chromosome population is created, and therefore can be
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regarded as “socialized” versions of the two algorithms. The difference between
the “individual” and the “social” learning versions of the algorithms is that in
the former case the population of each player is updated on itself (i.e. only the
chromosomes of the specific player’s population are taken into account when the
new generation is formed), while on the latter, all chromosomes are copied into a
common “pool”, then the usual genetic operators (crossover and mutation) are
used to form the new generation of that aggregate population and finally each
chromosome of the generation is copied back to its corresponding player’s pop-
ulation. Thus we have “social learning”, since the alternative strategic choices
of a given player at a specific generation, as given by the chromosomes that
comprise its population, are affected by the chromosomes (the ideas should we
say) all other players had at the previous generation.
Vriend’s individual learning algorithm is presented in pseudo-code [14].
1. “A set of strategies [chromosomes representing quantities] is randomly drawn
for each player.
2. While Period < T
(a) (If Period mod GArate = 0): Using GA procedures {as roulette wheel
selection single, random point crossover and mutation, for generating a
new set of strategies for each player [15]}, a new set of strategies is created
for each firm.
(b) Each player selects one strategy. The realized profit is calculated [and the
fitness of the corresponding chromosomes, is defined, based on that profit].
Co-evolutionary programming is quite similar, with the difference that the ran-
dom match-ups between the chromosomes of the players’ population at a given
generation are finished when all chromosomes have participated in a game; and
then the population is updated, instead of having a parameter (GArate) that
defines the generations at which populations update takes place. The algorithm,
described by pseudo-code, is as follows [13]:
1. Initialize the strategy population of each player.
2. Choose one strategy from the population of each player randomly, among the
strategies that have not already been assigned profits. Input the strategy infor-
mation to the tournament. The result of the tournament will decide profit and
fitness values for these chosen strategies.
3. Repeat step (2) until all strategies have a profit value assigned.
4. Apply the evolutionary operators [selection, crossover, mutation] to each player’s
population. Keep the best strategy of the current generation alive (elitism).
5. Repeat steps (2)-(4) until maximum number of generations has been reached.
In our implementation, we don’t use elitism. The reason is that by using only
selection proportional to fitness, single (random) point crossover and finally,
mutation with fixed mutation rate for each chromosome bit throughout the
simulation, we ensure that the algorithms can be classified as canonical economic
GA’s (Riechmann 2001), and that their underlying stochastic process form an
ergodic Markov Chain [12].
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In order to ensure convergence to Nash Equilibrium, we introduce the two
“social” versions of the above algorithms. Vriend’s multi-population algorithm
could be transformed to:
1. A set of strategies [chromosomes representing quantities] is randomly drawn for
each player.
2. While Period < T
(a) (If Period mod GArate = 0): Use GA procedures (roulette wheel selection,
single, random point crossover and mutation), to create a new generation of
chromosomes, from a population consisting of the chromosomes belonging
to the union of the players’ populations. Copy the chromosomes of the
new generation to the corresponding player’s population, to form a new
set of strategies for each player.
(b) Each player selects one strategy. The realized profit is calculated (and the
fitness of the corresponding chromosomes, is defined, based on that profit).
And social co-evolutionary programming is defined as:
1. Initialize the strategy population of each player
2. Choose one strategy of the population of each player randomly from among
the strategies that have not already been assigned profits. Input the strategy
information to the tournament. The result of the tournament will decide profit
values for these chosen strategies.
3. Repeat step (2) until all strategies are assigned a profit value.
4. Apply the evolutionary operators (selection, crossover, mutation) at the union
of players’ populations. Copy the chromosomes of the new generation to the
corresponding player’s population to form the new set of strategies.
5. Repeat steps (2)-(4) until maximum number of generations has been reached.
So the difference between the social and individual learning variants is that
chromosomes are first copied in an aggregate population, and the new generation
of chromosomes is formed from the chromosomes of this aggregate population.
From an economic point of view, this means that the players take into account
their opponents choices when they update their set of alternative strategies. So
we have a social variant of learning, and since each player has its own population,
the algorithms should be classified as “social multi-population economic Genetic
Algorithms” [11],[12]. It is important to note that the settings of the game allow
the players to observe their opponent choices after every game is played, and
take them into account, consequently, when they update their strategy sets.
It is not difficult to show that the stochastic process of all the algorithms
presented here form a regular Markov chain [9]. In the co-evolutionary program-
ming algorithms (both individual and social), and since the matchings are made
at random, the expected profit of the jth chromosome of player’s i population
qiji is (we assume n players and K chromosomes in each population)
E[pi(qiji)] =
1
(n− 1)K
K∑
j1=1
. . .
K∑
ji−1=1
K∑
ji+1=1
. . .
6
K∑
jn=1
pi(qiji ; q1j1 , . . . , q(i−1)(ji−1), q(i+1)(ji+1), . . . , qnjn)
The expected profit for Vriend’s algorithm [14]
E[pi(qij ;Q−i)] = p¯qij − C(qij)
with
p¯ =
∑
l 6=i
p(qij ,
∑
l
qlj)f(qlj |GArate)
where f(qij |GARate) is the frequency of each individual strategy of other firms,
conditioned by the strategy selection process and GArate.
Any fitness function that is defined on the profit of the chromosomes, either
proportional to profit, scaled or ordered, has a value that is solely dependent
on the chromosomes of the current population. And, since the transition prob-
abilities of the underlying stochastic process depend only on the fitness and,
additionally, the state of the chain is defined by the chromosomes of the current
population, the transition probabilities from one state of the GA to another, are
solely dependent on the current state (see also [12]). The stochastic process of
the populations is therefore, a Markov Chain. And since the final operator used
in all the algorithms presented here is the mutation operator, there is a positive
-and fixed- probability that any bit of the chromosomes in the population is
negated. Therefore any state (set of populations) is reachable from any other
state -in just one step actually- and the chain is regular.
Having a Markov chain implies that the usual performance measures -namely
mean value and variance- are not adequate to perform statistical inference, since
the observed values in the course of the genetic algorithm are inter-dependent.
In a regular Markov chain however, one can estimate the limiting probabilies of
the chain by estimating the components of the fixed frequency vector the chain
converges to, by
pii =
Ni
N
(9)
where Ni is the number of observations in which the chain is at state i and
N is the total number of observations [4]. In the algorithms presented here,
however, the number of states is extremely large. If we have n players, with k
chromosomes consisting of l bits in each player’s population, the total number of
possible states is 2knl, making the estimation of the limiting probabilities of all
possible states, practically impossible. On the other hand, one can estimate the
limiting probability of one or more given states, without needing to estimate the
limiting probabilities of all the other states. A state of importance could be the
state where all chromosomes of all populations represent the Nash Equilibrium
quantity (which is the same for all players, since we have a symmetric game).
We call this state Nash State.
Another solution could be the introduction of lumped states [9]. Lumped
states are disjoint aggregate states consisting of more than one state, with their
union being the entire space. Although the resulting stochastic process is not
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necessarily Markovian, the expected frequency of the lumped states can still be
estimated from (9). The definition of the lumped states can be based on the
average Hamming distance between the chromosomes in the populations and
the chromosome denoting the Nash Equilibrium quantity. Denoting qij the jth
chromosome of the ith player’s population, and NE the chromosome denoting
the Nash Equilibrium quantity, the Hamming distance d(qij , NE) between qij
andNE would be equal to the number of bits that differ in the two chromosomes,
and the average Hamming distance between the chromosomes in the populations
from the Nash chromosome would be
d¯ =
1
nK
n∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
d(qij , n) (10)
where n is the number of players in the game and K is the number of chro-
mosomes in each player’s population.We define the ith lumped state Si as the
set of states si, in which the chromosomes’ average Hamming distance from the
Nash chromosome is less or equal to i and greater to i− 1
Definition 1. Si = {si|i− 1 < d¯ (qij ∈ si, n) ≤ i}, for i = 1, . . . , n
The maximum value of d¯ is equal to the maximum value of the Hamming
distance between a given chromosome and the Nash chromosome. The maxi-
mum value between two chromosomes is obtained when all bits differ, and it
is equal to the length of the chromosomes L. Therefore we have L different
lumped states S1, S2, . . . , SL. We also define S0 to be the individual Nash state
(the state reached when all populations consist of the single chromosome that
corresponds to the Nash Equilibrium quantity) which gives us a total of L + 1
states. This ensures that the union of the Si is the entire populations’ space,
and they consist, therefore, a set of lumped states [9].
4 Simulation Settings
We use two variants of the three models in our simulations. One about n = 4
players and one having n = 20 players. We use 20-bits chromosomes for the
n = 4 players case and 8-bits chromosomes for the n = 20 case. A usual
mechanism [3],[15] is used to transform chromosome values to quantities. After
an arbitrary choice for the maximum quantity, the quantity that corresponds to
a given chromosome is given by:
q =
1
qmax
L∑
k=1
qijk2k−1 (11)
where L is the length of the chromosome and qijk is the value of the kth bit of
the given chromosome (0 or 1). According to (11) the feasible quantities belong
in the interval [0, qmax]. By setting
qmax = 3qˆ (12)
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where qˆ is the Nash Equilibrium quantity of the corresponding model, we ensure
that the Nash Equilibrium of the continuous model is one of the feasible solutions
of the discrete model, analyzed by the genetic algorithms, and that the NE of
the discrete model will be therefore, the same as the one for the continuous
case. And, as it can be easily proven by mathematical induction, that the
chromosome corresponding to the Nash Equilibrium quantity, will always be
0101 . . . 01, provided that chromosome length is an even number.
The GArate parameter needed in the original and the “socialized” versions
of Vriend’s algorithms, is set to GArate = 50, an efficient value suggested in the
literature [15],[14]. We use single - point crossover, with the point at which chro-
mosomes are combined [8] chosen at random. Probability of crossover is always
set up to 1, i.e. all the chromosomes of a new generation are products of the
crossover operation, between selected parents. The probability of mutating any
single bit of a chromosome is fixed throughout any given simulation -something
that ensures the homogeneity of the underlying Markov process. The values
that have been used (for both cases of n = 4 and n = 20) are
pm = 0.1, 0.075, . . . , 0.000025, 0.00001.
We used populations consisting of
pop = 20, 30, 40, 50
chromosomes. These choices were made after preliminary tests that evaluated
the convergence properties of the algorithms for various population choices, and
they are in accordance to the population sizes used in the literature ([15],[1],
etc.).
Finally, the maximum number of generations that a given simulation runs,
were
T = 103, 2 ∗ 103, 5 ∗ 103, 104, 2 ∗ 104, 5 ∗ 104
Note that the number of total iterations (number of games played) of Vriend’s
individual and social algorithms is GArate times the number of generations,
while in the co-evolutionary programming algorithms is number of generations
times the number of chromosomes in a population, which is the number of
match-ups.
We run 300 independent simulations for each set of settings for all the al-
gorithms, so that the test statistics and the expected time to reach the Nash
Equilibrium (NE state, or first game with NE played), are estimated effectively.
5 Presentation of Selected Results
Although the individual - learning versions of the two algorithms led the esti-
mated expected value of the average quantity (as given in eq.(13))
Q¯ =
1
nT
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
qit (13)
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(T = number of iterations, n = number of players), close to the corresponding
average quantity of the NE, the strategies of each one of the players converged
to different quantities. That fact can be seen in figures 1 to 3, that show the
outcome of some representative runs of the two individual - learning algorithms
in the polynomial model (6). The trajectory of the average market quantity in
Vriend’s algorithm
Q =
1
n
n∑
i=1
qit (14)
(calculated in (14) and shown in figure 1) is quite similar to the trajectory of
the same measure in the co-evolutionary case, and a figure of the second case
is omitted. The estimated average values of the two measures (eq.(13)) were
86.2807 and 88.5472 respectively, while the NE quantity in the polynomial model
(6) is 86.9401. The unbiased estimators for the standard deviations of the Q
(eq.(15)) were 3.9776 and 2.6838, respectively.
sQ =
1
T − 1
T∑
i=1
(Qi − Q¯)2 (15)
The evolution of the individual players’ strategies can be seen in figures 2 and
Figure 1: Mean Quantity in one execution of Vriend’s individual learning algo-
rithm in the polynomial model for n = 4 players. pop = 50, GArate = 50, pcr =
1, pmut = 0.01, T = 2, 000 generations.
3. The estimators of the mean values of each player’s quantities (calculated by
eq.(16))
q¯i =
1
T
T∑
i=1
qi (16)
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Figure 2: Players’ quantities in one execution of Vriend’s individual learning
algorithm in the polynomial model for n = 4 players. pop = 50, GArate =
50, pcr = 1, pmut = 0.01, T = 2, 000 generations.
Figure 3: Players’ quantities in one execution of the individual - learning version
of the co-evolutionary programming algorithm in the polynomial model for n =
4 players. pop = 50, pcr = 1, pmut = 0.01, T = 2, 000 generations.
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are given on table 1, while the frequencies of the lumped states in these simu-
lations are given on table 2.
Player Vriend’s algorithm Co-evol. programming
1 91.8309 77.6752
2 65.3700 97.8773
3 93.9287 93.9287
4 93.9933 93.9933
Table 1: Mean values of players’ quantities in two runs of the individual-learning
algorithms in the polynomial model for n = 4 players. pop = 50, GArate =
50, pcr = 1, pmut = 0.01, T = 2, 000 generations.
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .8725 .0775
s11 s12 s13 s14 s15 s16 s17 s18 s19 s20
.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
CP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .0025 .1178 .867
s11 s12 s13 s14 s15 s16 s17 s18 s19 s20
.0127 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Lumped states frequencies in two runs of the individual-learning algo-
rithms in the polynomial model for n = 4 players. pop = 50, pcr = 1, pmut =
0.01, T = 100, 000 generations.
That significant difference between the mean values of players’ quantities
was observed in all simulations of the individual - learning algorithms, in all
models and in both n = 4 and n = 20, for all the parameter sets used (which
were described in the previous section). We used a sample of 300 simulation
runs for each parameter set and model, for hypothesis testing. The hypothesis
H0 : Q¯ = qNash was accepted for a = .05 in all cases. On the other hand, the
hypotheses H0 : qi = qNash, were rejected for all players in all models, when the
probability of rejection the hypothesis, under the assumption it is correct, was
a = .05. There was not a single Nash Equilibrium game played, in any of the
simulations of the two individual - learning algorithms.
In the social - learning versions of the two algorithms, both the hypotheses
H0 : Q¯ = qNash, and H0 : qi = qNash were accepted for a = .05, for all models
and parameters sets. We used a sample of 300 different simulations for every
parameter set, in those cases, as well.
The evolution of the individual players’ quantities in a given simulation of
Vriend’s algorithm on the polynomial model (as in fig.2) can be seen in fig.4.
Notice that the all players’ quantities have the same mean values (eq. (16)).
The mean values of the individual players’ quantities for pop = 40, pcr =
1, pmut = 0.00025, T = 10, 000 generations, are given, for one simulation of
all the algorithms (social and individual versions) on table 3.
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Figure 4: Players’ quantities in one execution of the social - learning version
of Vriend’s algorithm in the polynomial model for n = 4 players. pop =
40, GArate = 50, pcr = 1, pmut = 0.00025, T = 10, 000 generations.
Player Social Social Individual Individual
Vriend’s alg. Co-evol. prog. Vriend’s alg. Co-evol. prog.
1 86.9991 87.0062 93.7536 97.4890
2 86.9905 87.0089 98.4055 74.9728
3 86.9994 87.0103 89.4122 82.4704
4 87.0046 86.9978 64.6146 90.4242
Table 3: Mean values of players’ quantities in two runs of the social-learning
algorithms in the polynomial model for n = 4 players. pop = 40, pcr = 1, pmut =
0.00025, T = 10, 000 generations.
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On the issue of establishing NE in -some- of the games played and reaching
the Nash State (all chromosomes of every population equals the chromosome
corresponding to the NE quantity) there are two alternative results. For one
subset of the parameters set, the social - learning algorithms managed to reach
the NE state and in a significant subset of the games played, all players used
the NE strategy (these subsets are shown on table 4).
Model Algorithm pop pmut T
4-Linear Vriend 20-40 .001− .0001 ≥ 5000
4-Linear Co-evol 20-40 .001− .0001 ≥ 5000
20-Linear Vriend 20 .00075− .0001 ≥ 5000
20-Linear Co-evol 20 .00075− .0001 ≥ 5000
4-poly Vriend 20-40 .001− .0001 ≥ 5000
4-poly Co-evol 20-40 .001− .0001 ≥ 5000
20-poly Vriend 20 .00075− .0001 ≥ 5000
20-poly Co-evol 20 .00075− .0001 ≥ 5000
4-radic Vriend 20-40 .001− .0001 ≥ 5000
4-radic Co-evol 20-40 .001− .0001 ≥ 5000
20-radic Vriend 20 .00075− .0001 ≥ 5000
20-radic Co-evol 20 .00075− .0001 ≥ 5000
Table 4: Parameter sets that yield NE. Holds true for both social - learning
algorithms.
In the cases where mutation probability was too large, the “Nash” chromo-
somes were altered significantly and therefore the populations couldn’t converge
to the NE state (within the given iterations). On the other hand, when the mu-
tation probability was low the number of iterations was not enough to have
convergence. A larger population, requires more generations to converge to the
“NE state” as well. The estimators of the limiting probabilities of one represen-
tative parameter set for representative cases of the first and second parameter
sets are given on table 5.
Apparently, the Nash state s0 has greater than zero frequency in the simulations
that reach it. The estimated time needed to reach Nash State (in generations), to
return to it again after departing from it, and the percentage of total games played
that were played on NE, are presented on table 61.
We have seen that the original individual - learning versions of the multi - pop-
ulation algorithms do not lead to convergence of the individual players’ choices, at
the Nash Equilibrium quantity. On the contrary, the “socialized” versions introduced
here, accomplish that goal and, for a given set of parameters, establish a very frequent
Nash State, making games with NE quite frequent as well, during the course of the
simulations. The statistical tests employed, proved that the expected quantities chosen
1Table 6: GenNE = Average number of Generations needed to reach s0, starting from
populations having all chromosomes equal to the opposite chromosome of the NE chromosome,
in the 300 simulations. RetT ime = Interarrival Times of s0(average number of generations
needed to return to s0) in the 300 simulations. NEGames = Percentage of games played that
were NE in the 300 simulations.
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s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
No
NE
0 0 .6448 .3286 .023 .0036 0 0 0 0 0
s11 s12 s13 s14 s15 s16 s17 s18 s19 s20
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10
NE .261 .4332 .2543 .0515 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s11 s12 s13 s14 s15 s16 s17 s18 s19 s20
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5: Lumped states frequencies in a run of a social-learning algorithm that
couldn’t reach NE and another that reached it. 20 players - polynomial model,
Vriend’s algorithms, pop = 20 and T = 10, 000 in both cases, pmut = .001 in the
1st case, pmut = .0001 in the 2nd.
Model Algorithm pop pmut T Gen
NE
Ret
Time
NE
Games
4-Linear Vriend 30 .001 10,000 3,749.12 3.83 5.54
4-Linear Co-evol 40 .0005 10,000 2,601.73 6.97 73.82
20-Linear Vriend 20 .0005 20,000 2,712.45 6.83 88.98
20-Linear Co-evol 20 .0001 20,000 2,321.32 6.53 85.64
4-poly Vriend 40 .00025 10,000 2,483.58 3.55 83.70
4-poly Co-evol 40 .0005 10,000 2,067.72 8.77 60.45
20-poly Vriend 20 .0005 20,000 2,781.24 9.58 67.60
20-poly Co-evol 20 .0005 50,000 2,297.72 ,6.63 83.94
4-radic Vriend 40 .00075 10,000 2,171.32 4.41 81.73
4-radic Co-evol 40 .0005 10,000 2,917.92 5.83 73.69
20-radic Vriend 20 .0005 20,000 2,136.31 7.87 75.34
20-radic Co-evol 20 .0005 20,000 2,045.81 7.07 79.58
Table 6: Markov and other statistics for NE.
by players converge to the NE in the social - learning versions while that convergence
cannot be achieved at the individual - learning versions of the two algorithms. There-
fore it can be argued that the learning process is qualitatively better in the case of
social learning. The ability of the players to take into consideration their opponents
strategies, when they update theirs, and base their new choices at the totality of ideas
that were used at the previous period (as in [1]), forces the strategies into consideration
to converge to each other and to converge to the NE strategy as well. Of course this
option would not be possible, if the profit functions of the individual players were not
the same, or, to state that condition in an equivalent way, if there were no symmetry
at the cost functions. If the cost functions are symmetric, a player can take note of its
opponents realized strategies in the course of play, and use them as they are when he
updates his ideas, since the effect of these strategies at his individual profit, will be the
same. Therefore the inadequate learning process of the individually based learning can
be perfected, at the symmetric case. One should note that the convergence to almost
identical values displayed in the representative cases of the previous section, holds for
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any parameter set used in all the models presented in this paper.
The stability properties of the algorithms, are identified by the frequencies of the
lumped states and the expected inter-arrival times estimated in the previous section
(table 6). The inter-arrival times of the representative cases shown there are less
than 10 generations. The inter-arrival times were in the same range, when the other
parameter sets that yielded convergence to “Nash state” were used. The frequencies of
the lumped states show that the ’Nash state’ s0 was quite frequent -for the cases it was
reached, of course- and that the states defined by populations, whose chromosomes
differ in less than one bits, on the average, from the Nash state itself, define the most
frequent lumped state (s1). As a matter of fact the sum of these two lumped states
s0, s1 was usually higher than .90. As it has been already shown [4] the estimators of
the limiting probabilities calculated by (9) and presented for given simulation runs,
on tables 2 and 5, are unbiased and efficient estimators for the expected frequencies
of the algorithm’s performance ad infinitum. The high expected frequencies of the
lumped states that are “near” the NE and the low inter-arrival time to the NE state
itself, ensure the stability of the algorithms.
Using these two algorithms as heuristics to discover unknown NE, requires a way
to distinguish the potential Nash Equilibrium chromosomes. When VS2 or CS3 con-
verge -in the sense mentioned above- to the “Nash state”, most chromosomes in the
populations of several of the generations at the end of the simulation, should be iden-
tical or almost identical (differing at a small number of bits) to the Nash Equilibrium
chromosome. Using this qualitatively rule, one should be able to find some potential
chromosomes to check for Nash Equilibrium. A more concise way, would be to record
the games that all players used the same quantities. Since symmetric profits functions
imply symmetric NE, apparently, one can confine his attention on these games, of all
the games played. In order to check if any of these quantities is the NE quantity,
one could assume that all but one players use that quantity and then solve (either
analytically, numerically or by a heuristic, depending on the complexity of the model
investigated) the single - variable maximization problem for the player’s profit, given
that the other players choose the quantity under consideration. If the solution of the
problem is the same quantity, then that quantity should be the Nash Equilibrium.
6 Conclusions
We have seen that the social-learning multi-population algorithms introduced here
lead to convergence of the individual quantities to the Nash Equilibrium quantity
on several Cournot models. That convergence was achieved for given parameter sets
(mutation probability, number of generations, etc.) and was true in a “Ljapunov”
sense, i.e. the strategies chosen fluctuated inside a region around the NE, while the
expected values were equal (as proven by a series of statistical tests) to the desired
value. This property, which does not hold for the individual - learning variants of the
two algorithms, allows one to construct heuristic algorithms to discover an unknown
Nash Equilibrium in symmetric games, provided the parameters used are suitable
and that the NE belongs in the feasible set of the chromosomes’ values. Finally,
the stability properties of the social-learning versions of the algorithms allow one to
use them as modeling tools in a multi - agent learning environment, that leads to
effective learning of the Nash Strategy. Paths for future research could be simulating
2Social - learning version of Vriend’s algorithm
3Social - learning version of co - evolutionary programming
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these algorithms for different bit-lengths of the chromosomes in the populations since,
apparently, the use of more bits for chromosome encoding implies more feasible values
for the chromosomes and, therefore, makes the inclusion of unknown NE in these sets,
more probable. Another idea would be to use different models, especially models that
do not have single NE. Finally one could try to apply the algorithms introduced here
in different game theoretic problems.
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